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In Cambridge Gas,1 the Privy Council heralded a more open and expansive 
attitude to cooperation based on the principle of “active assistance”, which, in 
the instant case, would allow for the recognition of a specific category of 
insolvency judgment (as opposed to the traditional classification of judgments 
in rem and in personam) and which subsequently would allow for the 
recognition and enforcement of such judgments subject only to two caveats, 
the existence of a domestic statutory rule to the contrary and the need to 
ensure the protection of creditors. In appealing to the principles of unity and 
universality in promoting the efficient centralisation of decision-making in one 
set of proceedings, the court’s views found favour in a number of other 
jurisdictions, including in Australia,2 Bermuda,3 the Cayman Islands,4 Jersey5 
and New Zealand.6 In 2012, however, two decisions, that of the Irish Supreme 
Court in Re Flightlease7 and that of the United Kingdom Supreme Court in 
Rubin,8 the latter also incidentally holding that Cambridge Gas was wrongly 
decided,9 marked a restoration in those jurisdictions of the more traditional 
common law approach to recognition and enforcement dependent on prior 
compliance with the rules developed for jurisdiction in personam and in rem. 
This has served to remind proponents of the modified universalism theory that 
some barriers may still exist to the recognition and enforcement of judgments 
given by courts that are exercising jurisdiction in insolvency over a debtor. 
 
In the same year as Rubin, but prior to the decision of the Supreme Court, 
another English case, Re Phoenix,10 had adopted the Cambridge Gas 
principle of “active assistance” in a slightly different context. It was dealing 
                                                 
1 Cambridge Gas Transportation Corp v. Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of 
Navigator Holdings plc [2006] UKPC 26. 
2 Bank of Western Australia v Henderson (No 3) [2011] FMCA 840 (obiter). 
3 Re Founding Partners Global Fund Ltd (No 2) [2011] SC (Bda) 19 Com. 
4 Re Lancelot Investors Fund Ltd (2008) (unreported), cited in S. Dickson, “The Quick March 
of Modified Universalism: Rubin v Eurofinance SA” (Mourant Ozannes Briefing, June 2010). 
5 Re Montrow International Ltd 2007 JLR Note 40. 
6 Williams v Simpson Civ 2010-419-1174 (12 October 2010) (High Court, Hamilton). 
7 Re Flightlease (Ireland) Ltd (In Voluntary Liquidation) [2012] IESC 12 (23 February 2012), 
noted by this author in An Irish Perspective on Insolvency Cooperation: The Re Flightlease 
Case (2013) 10 ICR 158. 
8 Conjoined Appeals in (1) Rubin & Anor v Eurofinance SA & Ors and (2) New Cap 
Reinsurance Corp Ltd & Anor v Grant and others [2012] UKSC 46 (24 October 2012), noted 
by this author in The Limits of Co-Operation at Common Law: Rubin v Eurofinance in the 
Supreme Court (2013) 10 ICR 106. 
9 Ibid., at paragraph 132 (per Lord Collins). 
10 Re Phoenix Kapitaldienst GmbH, Schmitt v Deichmann & Ors [2012] EWHC 62 (Ch) (23 
January 2012), noted by this author in The Resurgence of Cross-Border Recognition and 
Enforcement of Insolvency Judgments: The Re Phoenix Case [2013] 9 ICCLR 329. 
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with the issue of whether the common law would allow assistance so as to 
permit the application of domestic provisions to come to the aid of an office-
holder acting on the basis of an appointment made in a foreign proceeding, 
who wished to bring proceedings within the jurisdiction, but might otherwise 
lack the powers to do so, absent the opening of a local insolvency proceeding. 
The court in Re Phoenix held four things: (i) that the common law contains 
powers to recognise and assist foreign office-holders; (ii) that assistance 
means doing whatever the court could do in domestic proceedings; (iii) that 
insolvency proceedings are about collective enforcement for the benefit of all 
creditors and include, the issue in that case in particular, set aside 
proceedings directed at third parties; and (iv) that set aside proceedings are in 
fact central to the purpose of insolvency proceedings.11 As such, the office-
holder would be permitted to bring the set aside action within the jurisdiction 
by the common law extending the benefit of the domestic statutory provision, 
which might otherwise be unavailable to the office-holder. 
 
Although decided later in time, the judgment in Rubin did not apparently 
disavow Re Phoenix, in fact omitting to mention it. As such, the persuasive 
precedent it set was subsequently followed in 2013 in the Cayman Islands in 
Primeo,12 a case that arose out of the Madoff litigation and which also 
involved the issue of claw-back transactions. In this case, the judge extended 
the benefit of the domestic provisions that would allow for the bringing of 
proceedings and, incidentally, mentioned his preference for the approach in 
Cambridge Gas to that in Rubin. In doing so, the judge in Primeo also 
appeared to restrict Rubin to its facts in much the same way as a later case in 
Ireland has also attempted to limit the impact of Re Flightlease, trying to 
preserve greater discretion for the courts as far as assistance is concerned.13 
It is also noteworthy that Re Flightlease itself did not rule out the particular 
change in rules contemplated by Cambridge Gas, but solely on the basis of 
consensus being achieved between the common law courts as to the 
desirability of such a move. 
 
A little later in 2013, and relying on the judgements in Re Phoenix and 
Primeo, Chief Justice Kawaley in Bermuda acknowledges a judicial 
preference for the Cambridge Gas methodology by permitting the common 
law to come to the aid of a foreign liquidator seeking a discovery and 
examination order against a third party.14 The case involved two companies, 
Saad Investments Company Ltd (“Saad”) and Singularis Holdings Ltd 
(“Singularis”), incorporated in the Cayman Islands and which were later the 
subject of liquidation orders in that jurisdiction. A petition was brought for an 
                                                 
11 Ibid., at paragraph 62. 
12 Picard and Anor v Primeo Fund (In Official Liquidation) (unreported) (14 January 2013) (per 
Andrew Jones J), noted by this author in Après Rubin: le Déluge? Thoughts on the Future of 
Common Law Insolvency Cooperation (2013) 10 ICR 356. 
13 Mount Capital Fund Ltd (In Liquidation) & Ors v Companies Act [2012] IEHC 97. 
14 Re Saad Investments Company Ltd (In Official Liquidation) and Re Singularis Holdings Ltd 
(In Official Liquidation) (2013) SC (Bda) 28 Com (15 April 2013), noted by this author in The 
“Empire” Strikes Back: Lessons for the Mother Country in Insolvency Cooperation [2013] 11 
ICCLR 411. Appreciation is due to His Honour Judge Ian Kawaley, Chief Justice of Bermuda, 
for drawing the author’s attention to his judgment at first instance and to that of the Court of 
Appeal , reported as [2013] CA (Bda) 7 Civ, that is the subject of comment in this article. 
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ancillary liquidation in Bermuda in the case of Saad, which was granted on 14 
September 2012.15 The liquidators in Bermuda then applied for orders in 
respect of the companies on 13 February 2013 for the production of 
documents held by the former auditors, PriceWaterhouse Coopers, as well as 
the examination of certain members of the auditing practice under the terms 
of section 195 of the Bermuda Companies Act 1981 (“section 195”).16 The 
liquidators of Singularis applied on 12 February 2013 for recognition and 
assistance at common law as well as for similar relief to that applied for in the 
case of Saad. Both cases were heard together for convenience,17 given that 
challenges were being brought on similar terms to the orders that had been 
granted on 4 March 2013.18 In the case of Saad, given that there could be no 
challenge to the basis on which the ancillary liquidation had been ordered and 
to which section 195 would undoubtedly apply, the resistance on the part of 
the auditors was to the granting of the order for examination and production of 
documents and its scope.19 In the case of Singularis, challenges were brought 
in respect of the same issues as well as whether the Bermudian court was 
able to invoke its inherent jurisdiction to provide the assistance sought, 
whether at common law or by applying the statute.20 
 
In providing a summary of his findings,21 the judge stated there were four 
elements in his findings: 
 
(i) Recognition might be validly forthcoming for the appointment of the 
liquidators in their jurisdiction and whom the court will assist at common 
law by the application by analogy of the statutory power contained in 
section 195 on the same terms as could be ordered under that 
provision in the case of a local or ancillary liquidation; 
(ii) The principles in Cambridge Gas which militate for judicial assistance 
at common law have survived the repudiation of the case by Rubin 
insofar as the recognition of insolvency proceedings and the 
appointment of office-holders in another jurisdiction was concerned; 
(iii) At the very least, the scope of the assistance that might be forthcoming 
to such office-holders would be governed by the inherent jurisdiction of 
the court together with any common law or equitable powers under the 
general law of Bermuda, without needing to invoke any statutes of 
particular application, although what could be done in a local liquidation 
will inform a court requiring to determine the extent of the assistance 
that may be forthcoming (“conservative demarcation”); 
                                                 
15 Re Saad and Re Singularis, First Instance Judgment, at paragraph 1. 
16 Section 195, Bermuda Companies Act 1981 reads (in part) as follows: “(1) The Court 
may… summon before it any officer of the company or persons known or suspected to have 
in his possession any property of the company or supposed to be indebted to the company, or 
any person whom the Court deems capable of giving information concerning the promotion, 
formation, trade, dealings, affairs or property of the company. (2) The Court may examine 
such person on oath… (3) The Court may require such person to produce any books and 
papers in his custody or power relating to the company...” 
17 Re Saad and Re Singularis, First Instance Judgment, at paragraph 2. 
18 Ibid., at paragraph 3. 
19 Ibid., at paragraph 4. 
20 Ibid., at paragraph 5. 
21 Ibid., at paragraph 8(a). 
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(iv) Alternatively, applying Cambridge Gas, particularly where it approved 
Re African Farms,22 and the persuasive precedent in Re Phoenix and 
Primeo, the scope of assistance could be determined by the court’s 
inherent jurisdiction and the general law, to which would be added the 
statutory insolvency regime that would apply in a local primary or 
ancillary liquidation (“radical demarcation”). 
 
The radical interpretation which suggested itself to the Bermudan judge in the 
last of these elements was to directly apply the local law which permitted 
discovery and examination, rather than a common law palimpsest of its 
contents, which would inevitably rely on the court’s view of its own inherent 
powers and extent of judicial cooperation feasible. The judge termed this 
approach “more principled” than any other that would serve in this case.23 
Referring to Re Phoenix, in which the judge’s own journey of discovery 
between Re Kingate24 and Re Founding Partners25 was the subject of 
mention, the judge noted the conclusion in that case to the effect that: 
 
“…assistance includes doing whatever the English court could have 
done in the case of a domestic insolvency”.26  
 
This conclusion rested on the statement in Cambridge Gas, in very similar 
language, which authorised the:  
 
“…domestic court [to] at least be able to provide assistance by doing 
whatever it could have done in the case of a domestic insolvency”.27  
 
However, a crucial element in relation to the latter statement was that it was 
made in a context that presupposed the statutory provision referred to could 
be used. For the judge, it would be a “very generous reading indeed” to 
transplant that statement into a context where local insolvency provisions 
would not apply and where an ancillary winding up would be a legal 
impossibility.28 However, some comfort was provided for precisely this step by 
the Cayman case of Primeo, to which reference was also made. In Primeo, 
the issue was whether the office-holder in foreign proceedings could bring a 
transactional avoidance claim in the Cayman Islands. Although his status had 
been recognised, it was accepted that the debtor he represented could not be 
wound up under Cayman Islands law. The issue was whether the avoidance 
provisions could be made available at common law by invoking the principles 
of assistance.  
 
                                                 
22 Re African Farms Ltd [1906] Transvaal Law Reports 373. 
23 Re Saad and Re Singularis, First Instance Judgment, at paragraph 49. 
24 Re Kingate Global Fund Ltd (in liquidation) et al. [2011] Bda LR 2. 
25 Above note 3. 
26 Re Saad and Re Singularis, First Instance Judgment, at paragraphs 50-53, citing Re 
Phoenix, above note 10, at paragraph 62. 
27 Ibid., at paragraph 53, citing Cambridge Gas, above note 1, at paragraph 22. 
28 Ibid., at paragraph 54. 
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The Cayman judge’s findings, which were reproduced at some length,29 were 
usefully summarised in the following way: that applying the local avoidance 
provisions was:  
 
“…an incidence of recognition and… consistent with the statutory 
objective”.30  
 
The Bermudian judge agreed, holding that assistance was an integral part of 
recognition.31 Support for this position was found in Re African Farms, where 
an ancillary liquidation has also been unavailable. Yet, in that case, the court 
held that assistance could be given to allow the foreign office-holder to deal 
with local assets as if these were within the jurisdiction of the foreign court, 
subject to any conditions necessary to protect local creditors or where local 
law mandated some requirement, language also adopted as part of the 
reasoning in Cambridge Gas. The reason for this assistance was firmly based 
in comity, despite the fact that the foreign and local insolvency systems were 
not identical in all respects, and mandated recognition on the basis of 
principle and convenience.32 
 
Re African Farms also decided matters on the basis of an analogy with the 
recognition of foreign judgments. The court stated that it would not re-examine 
matters decided by a competent court, but would treat the subject matter of 
the judgment as a “new and independent obligation” which the court would, as 
a matter of justice and expediency, recognise and enforce.33 This offered to 
the judge in the instant case the opportunity to consider the parallels that 
could be drawn with the enforcement of personal money judgments at 
common law. Referring to a summary of the position in Bermuda,34 the judge 
noted the willingness of the courts in Bermuda to enforce a foreign judgment 
provided it were final and conclusive and not impeachable for want of 
compliance with any of the common law’s requirements in relation to 
jurisdiction, procedural fairness, public policy or natural justice. For the judge, 
the fundamental aim of the common law proceedings to enforce a foreign 
money judgment was to achieve recognition on a summary basis without a full 
trial. This would result in a final local judgment which could be enforced using 
any and all of the available local procedural mechanisms. The aims of 
common law enforcement of a foreign insolvency order, which may include 
recognition of the status and/or capacity of a foreign office-holder, were 
“broadly similar”.35  
 
In this light, the judge asked a simple question: by declaring in an action that a 
foreign office-holder had been validly appointed in foreign proceedings, was 
the local court not “effectively domesticating” the foreign order? As such, 
would the result not be to declare that the recognition carried with it 
                                                 
29 Ibid., at paragraphs 55-56. 
30 Ibid., at paragraph 57, citing Primeo, above note 12, at paragraph 41. 
31 Ibid., at paragraph 58. 
32 Ibid., at paragraphs 59-63, citing Re African Farms, above note 22, at 377 and 381-382. 
33 Ibid., at paragraph 64, citing Re African Farms, above note 22, at 391-392. 
34 Ibid., at paragraph 65, citing Muhl v Ardra [1997] Bda LR 36. 
35 Ibid., at paragraph 66. 
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recognition of the same status as the foreign office-holder would have under 
the law of the principal insolvency? Furthermore, would this not enable the 
foreign office-holder to act as an office-holder within the jurisdiction of the 
recognising court?36 Answering all these questions in the affirmative served 
as a “trigger” to bring into play the general law of Bermuda as well as, in 
addition, the statutory insolvency regime, provided this did not result in any 
distortion of the purposes of the statutory provisions nor any conflict with 
domestic public policy.37 For the judge, it would be absurd that the recognition 
process would not result in making all relevant Bermudian law available to the 
foreign office-holder, including, as in the instant case, provisions facilitating 
examination and production of documents.38 However, the “domestication” of 
the order might not go so far as to apply the local insolvency regime in “such a 
comprehensive way” as to create ancillary proceedings in substance.39 This 
might be “a bridge too far”.40 Short of this, though, it would accord with both 
“principle and pragmatism”, as well as the view in Re African Farms, that a 
recognition order should enable the foreign office-holder to take advantage of 
local general and insolvency law.41 
 
Court of Appeal Judgment 
 
It was undoubtedly the case that the matter would be appealed. Apart from 
the interests at stake, a critical issue for the local courts was whether the 
principles in Cambridge Gas, which, as a decision of the Privy Council, would 
ordinarily bind them, or those in Rubin, which represented a statement of the 
common law that would be authoritative for the courts in Bermuda where the 
common law has been received, should apply. Were the two cases utterly 
irreconcilable and, if so, which approach should be preferred? 
 
Before the Court of Appeal,42 after a brief recitation of the facts,43 the judge 
summarised the appellants’ case and the four grounds on which they relied.44 
The first was that the court at first instance had no jurisdiction to make a 
winding up order against Saad, which the appellants had not sought 
previously to challenge before that court, but now argued against.45 The 
second was a similar contention aimed at the court’s jurisdiction to make the 
orders in the case of Singularis, whether at common law or on grounds 
analogous to section 195. This ground rested on the argument being made 
that the judge at first instance was wrong to hold that Rubin did not fully 
                                                 
36 Ibid., at paragraph 67. 
37 Ibid., at paragraph 68. 
38 Ibid., at paragraphs 69-70. The point is also made that application of the relevant conflict of 
laws rules would lead to the use of the lex fori, here Bermudian law, and the natural extension 
of the rules that are part of that legal order. 
39 Ibid., at paragraph 74, where the judge also makes the observation that his judgment 
should not be interpreted as affording foreign office-holders automatic access to transaction 
avoidance provisions on the same terms as in Re Phoenix and Primeo. 
40 Ibid., at paragraph 71. 
41 Ibid., at paragraphs 72-73. 
42 Coram Zacca P, Auld JA and Bell AJA. 
43 Judgment of Bell AJA, at paragraphs 1-3 (Zacca P concurring with this judgment). 
44 Ibid., at paragraph 4. 
45 Ibid., at paragraph 5. 
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disavow Cambridge Gas and that the court should have, where the Privy 
Council decision had thus been disapproved, follow the earlier case of Al-
Sabah,46 with which Cambridge Gas conflicted. Further, the appeal on this 
ground also rested on arguments that the court was wrong in particular to rely 
on the decisions in Re African Farms, Re Phoenix and Primeo.47 The third 
ground was an alternative contention that, even if the powers existed to 
enable the court to do as it did, the powers could not extend beyond those 
available to the liquidator in his home jurisdiction, the understanding here 
being that the Cayman Islands equivalent would not have permitted discovery 
in relation to certain documents, i.e. those “relating” to the company, as 
opposed to those that were the company’s property.48 The final ground related 
to the absence of undertakings being fulfilled with respect to the provision of 
security for costs in relation to compliance with the court’s orders.49 
 
After providing the context of the appeal, in particular some of the history of 
the complex litigation surrounding the liquidation of the two companies 
concerned,50 the judge turns to the grounds of appeal. The first argument can 
be dismissed easily, in the judge’s view, because of the decision in PWC v 
Kingate,51 where the court states in clear terms that a challenge against 
jurisdiction to wind the company up cannot be made in the course of an 
application made under the terms of that winding up.52 This relies on the 
dictum of Chadwick J in Re Mid East Trading,53 to the effect that a decision to 
challenge must be made in the context of an application to resist the making 
of the winding up order, to rescind it or on appeal from it and not on an 
application incidental to it where not “all those affected have the opportunity to 
be heard”.54 This is subject to whether, on the face of it, there has been a 
patent irregularity.55 Holding that there has been no such irregularity and 
further rejecting an argument that the appellants were strangers to the 
liquidation, given their status as auditors, an argument which had also been 
rejected in the PWC v Kingate case itself, the judge finds that the clear rule in 
that case binds the court and that the appellants accordingly have no standing 
to be able to challenge the liquidation order.56 
 
On the second ground, whether the powers were available to the office-holder 
in the way the judge at first instance contemplated, the Court of Appeal states 
the essential question being whether it should consider itself to be bound by 
the Privy Council authority in Cambridge Gas or whether, in light of the 
decision in Rubin, the earlier decision in Al-Sabah should prevail. The court 
                                                 
46 Al-Sabah v Grupo Torras [2005] 2 AC 333. 
47 Judgment of Bell AJA, at paragraph 6. 
48 Ibid., at paragraph 7. 
49 Ibid., at paragraph 8. 
50 Ibid., at paragraphs 9-16. 
51 PWC Bermuda v Kingate Global Fund Ltd (Ct of Appl) [2011] Bda LR 32. 
52 Judgment of Bell AJA, at paragraphs 17-19. 
53 Re Mid East Trading Ltd [1998] BCC 726. 
54 Ibid., at 746 (per Chadwick LJ). 
55 Judgment of Bell AJA, at paragraph 20. 
56 Ibid., at paragraphs 21-27. The judgement given by Auld JA would have allowed the 
challenge by the appellants to also succeed under this head with a consequent impact on the 
legitimacy of the discovery and production orders. 
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does not think the decision in Re HIH57 adds much to this debate apart from a 
general statement on cooperation, its subject matter being something wholly 
different to the present case.58 Turning to Al-Sabah, a decision of the Privy 
Council which also included Lord Hoffmann, architect of the judgment in 
Cambridge Gas,59 the court recites the essential facts involving an application 
under a Letter of Request from a Bahamian court for the setting aside of two 
trusts established under Cayman Islands law. The Cayman court accedes to 
the request, holding that it has the power under the relevant statute and also 
as a matter of the court’s inherent jurisdiction to enable the trustee to enjoy 
powers to apply to set aside the trusts.60 This position is confirmed at appeal 
and by the Privy Council. However, the judgment, in dealing with the position 
at common law, though accepting that an inherent jurisdiction might have 
been available to assist, considered it limited and, in any event, not to permit 
the exercise of powers under a domestic provision in circumstances not falling 
within its terms i.e. inherent powers cannot go beyond the boundaries of any 
domestic provision and are more limited in scope. This, the judge admits, is 
the appellants’ argument “in a nutshell”.61 
 
Noting the facts of Cambridge Gas,62 the court highlighted the observations of 
Lord Hoffmann to the effect that the arguments put forward by Cambridge 
Gas about submission to jurisdiction did not appear to be in keeping with 
economic reality given the submission of other parts of the group.63 It also 
referred to his statement on the purpose of bankruptcy proceedings, namely 
as a mechanism for collective execution, before going onto Lord Hoffmann’s 
reliance on the statement in Re African Farms as to the meaning of active 
assistance,64 which the court noted he adopted by means of the proposition 
that the domestic court must be able to do all it could otherwise have done in 
the case of a domestic insolvency, with the purpose of recognition being to 
avoid the office-holder or creditors from having to begin parallel proceedings 
by affording them the remedies they would have been entitled to had the 
proceedings in fact taken place before the domestic forum.65 This statement, 
though objected to by the appellants, who contend that Re African Farms was 
simply a case of enforcement, is at the basis of the adoption by the judge at 
first instance of the view that there was little doubt as to the court’s 
jurisdictional competence to grant the remedies sought.66 Before dealing with 
these observations, the court reviews the decision in Rubin,67 noting the 
leading judgement by Lord Collins which it says succeeds on conflict of laws 
grounds.68 As to the relationship between Rubin and Cambridge Gas, the 
court notes Lord Mance’s otherwise concurring judgment did not subscribe 
                                                 
57 Re HIH Casualty and General Insurance Ltd [2008] 1 WLR 852. 
58 Judgment of Bell AJA, at paragraph 28. 
59 Ibid., at paragraph 29. 
60 Ibid., at paragraph 30. 
61 Ibid., at paragraph 31. 
62 Ibid., at paragraph 32. 
63 Ibid., at paragraph 33. 
64 Ibid., at paragraph 34. 
65 Ibid., at paragraph 35. 
66 Ibid., at paragraph 36. 
67 Ibid., at paragraph 37. 
68 Ibid., at paragraph 38. 
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necessarily to Lord Collins’ “incidental observation” on the status of 
Cambridge Gas as a decision of the Privy Council.69 The court also refers to 
Lord Mance’s statement that, notwithstanding any views on the validity of 
Cambridge Gas, the decision does not “cover or control” the facts of the 
appeal in Rubin.70 A similar view is expressed in Lord Clarke’s dissenting 
judgment who holds that, at the very least, Cambridge Gas is distinguishable, 
though he does not agree that it is wrongly decided.71 Interestingly, the court 
analyses Lord Collins’ own repudiation and is of the view that the rejection of 
Cambridge Gas appears to be uniquely from a conflict of laws’ perspective,72 
citing his other views in support of the position in Re Impex73 and Lord 
Hoffmann’s otherwise “brilliantly expressed opinion” in Cambridge Gas.74 
 
Reiterating the appellants’ position that Rubin had disapproved of Cambridge 
Gas,75 the court’s essential query is whether Lord Hoffmann’s statement on 
the purpose of recognition can be regarded as the ratio of Cambridge Gas 
and if, as such, it has now been disapproved of by Rubin. For the court, the 
arguments that Rubin disapproved of Cambridge Gas are not convincing, 
given the contents of the majority judgment and the indications, by reason of 
the statements in both the concurring and dissenting judgments, that the issue 
of whether Cambridge Gas was wrongly decided may not even have been 
argued before the Supreme Court. Interestingly, the court inclines to the view 
that Lord Hoffmann’s statement is not in fact the true ratio of the case and 
thus cannot bind the court.76 After a brief aside on the nature of judicial 
precedent, insofar as it affects the decisions of the Privy Council,77 the court 
returns to the apparent conflict between Rubin and Cambridge Gas. It states, 
perhaps surprisingly, that consideration should be given to the context in 
which those statements are made, that in fact they are qualifications on the 
application of the principles in Re African Farms and are aimed at elucidating 
the limits on the assistance that can be offered at common law if statutory 
powers are not available. The reference to the purpose of recognition so as to 
avoid the commencement of parallel proceedings does not apply in the instant 
case because of the impossibility of opening those proceedings within the 
jurisdiction.78 Similarly, the statement in Al-Sabah on the inherent jurisdiction 
of the court to set aside a trust is not really a statement on the assistance to 
be granted to an office-holder of the type present in the instant case.79 
Dismissing much of what had been relied on by both sides in the case, the 
court seeks to ascertain on what basis it might be said that section 195 can 
apply where its parent statute has no application. Further, in the absence of 
that application, the court doubts that its application by way of analogy, to use 
                                                 
69 Ibid., at paragraph 39, referring to Rubin, above note 8, at paragraph 178. 
70 Ibid., at paragraph 40, referring to Rubin, above note 8, at paragraph 188. 
71 Ibid., at paragraph 41, referring to Rubin, above note 8, at paragraph 192. 
72 Ibid., at paragraph 42, referring to Rubin, above note 8, at paragraph 132. 
73 Re Impex Services Worldwide Ltd [2004] BPIR 564. 
74 Judgment of Bell AJA, at paragraph 43, referring to Rubin, above note 8, at paragraphs 33 
and 92. 
75 Ibid., at paragraph 44. 
76 Ibid., at paragraph 45. 
77 Ibid., at paragraphs 46-47. 
78 Ibid., at paragraph 48. 
79 Ibid., at paragraph 49. 
 10
the “principled approach” the Chief Justice suggests, has no basis at common 
law. As such, Re Phoenix and Primeo can have no bearing on determining 
what the position is at Bermudian common law,80 nor is the statement in 
Cambridge Gas on which much reliance has been placed the true ratio of the 
case and thus is not binding on the court.81 
 
For the court, the fact a winding up order has been made in the Caymans in 
respect of a Cayman company with its sole link to Bermuda being that it was 
audited by the Dubai office of a Bermuda exempted partnership would not 
found jurisdiction for proceedings in Bermuda against the company and, 
further, would not found an application using the pretext of cross-border 
insolvency assistance for a section 195 order in circumstances where the 
office-holders would be unable to obtain an equivalent order in their own 
jurisdiction. In the court’s view, this would be “unjustifiable forum shopping” 
that would be grounds for an appeal in the Singularis case.82 As far as Saad 
was concerned, as the order opening liquidation proceedings could not be 
challenged, the issue was whether the discovery and production were 
properly made. This was determined, after some lengthy analysis as to the 
proper extent of discretion, by the court in the affirmative.83 Consequently, the 
issue of compliance costs and security fell to be determined in the appellants’ 
favour.84 
 
Analysis and Impact 
 
Notwithstanding the existence of many initiatives aimed at providing cross-
border support by way of assistance provisions in statutory or treaty form, 
developed in particular in the 20th century, on occasion such texts may not 
apply to the particular relationship between the jurisdictions concerned or to 
the subject matter of the case, on occasion also by reason of the nature of the 
debtor itself, as was the case in Re Phoenix. This necessitates recourse to 
the common law. In this context, assistance would depend on the willingness 
of courts to exercise their discretion to do so by appealing to principles they 
believed to apply to these cross-border situations, whether comity, 
convenience/expediency or benefit to creditors. Over the centuries that 
common law courts have been asked to assist, the jurisprudence has 
revealed many instances and types of cooperation offered, including 
recognition of proceedings and of the appointment of the office-holder,85 
recognition of the office-holder’s title to assets or to pursue debts,86 ordering 
stays or discharge of domestic proceedings,87 giving way to foreign 
proceedings in matters of determining parties’ entitlements,88 restraining 
                                                 
80 Ibid., at paragraph 50. 
81 Ibid., at paragraph 51. 
82 Ibid., at paragraph 52. 
83 Ibid., at paragraphs 53-61. 
84 Ibid., at paragraph 62-63. 
85 There are some very early examples of this, including in Solomons v Ross (1764) 1 Hy. Bl. 
131n; 126 ER 79; Sill v Worswick (1781) 1 H. Bl. 665. 
86 Bergerem v Marsh (1921) B&CR 195; Schemmer and Ors v Property Resources Ltd and 
Ors [1975] 1 Ch 273. 
87 Re Queensland Mercantile Agency (1888) 58 LT 878. 
88 Banque Indosuez SA v Ferromet Resources Inc [1993] BCLC 112. 
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actions by creditors (including universal injunctions),89 requiring the 
examination and production of documents,90 mandating the remittance of 
funds to office-holders for the purpose of foreign proceedings91 as well as 
approving a reconstruction scheme voted on by the creditors.92 The doctrine 
of ancillary assistance, by which courts would initiate liquidations of the 
debtor’s business within the jurisdiction to assist foreign proceedings, is also 
of some vintage, although now the authority tends to come from statute.93 
 
In this light, the decision in Re Phoenix does not at first seem surprising. All 
the court is seemingly doing is, following recognition of his appointment, 
capacity and status, authorising the foreign office-holder to bring proceedings 
in the United Kingdom to pursue a debt. The basis, though, for the action is 
not an acknowledged debt, nor is the action simply the enforcement of a 
foreign money judgment that would undoubtedly already comply with the 
common law canons referred to in Rubin, but the bringing of a claim for a debt 
alleged to be owed to the debtor’s estate by reason of a transaction that 
infringes the canons of insolvency law, notably those on claw-back or 
vulnerable transactions. These types of claims are becoming increasingly the 
norm in insolvency, particularly in large-scale financial insolvencies, where 
disputes over the origins, use and destination of funds result in contending 
ownership/property claims that require to be resolved. The vehicle for the 
action is also a novelty: the foreign office-holder is being authorised to use a 
provision of domestic insolvency law that is normally accessible only if a 
domestic or ancillary liquidation is opened of if the assistance provision in 
domestic law so provides.94 The offer of this vehicle is made by the court 
seemingly because of the injunction in favour of active assistance, lately 
uttered in Cambridge Gas, but going back to many cases before this, 
including Re African Farms. The effect is to offer a tool to the office-holder 
that might not otherwise be available in furtherance of the view that 
assistance includes doing what a domestic court could have done in the event 
of a domestic insolvency.95 Primeo picks this principle up and runs with it, 
holding that domestic claw-back provisions are similarly available to a foreign 
office-holder. Moreover, the court will do so on the basis of treating the debtor 
as if it were in ancillary liquidation, although quite clearly it could not fall within 
the jurisdiction provisions of the statute. 
 
In the Bermudian case, whose subject is an examination and production of 
documents order, the judge at first instance is able to accept the rationale for 
following the path illuminated by Re Phoenix and Primeo. He states that the 
powers being extended by way of assistance are, at the very least, common 
law creations guided by the scope and extent of the equivalent statutory 
                                                 
89 Re Vocalion (Foreign) Ltd [1932] 2 Ch 196.  
90 Re Impex Services Worldwide Ltd [2004] BPIR 564. 
91 Re BCCI (No 10) [1997] Ch 213. 
92 Re English, Scottish and Australian Chartered Bank [1893] 3 Ch 385. 
93 Sections 221 and 225, Insolvency Act 1986 (United Kingdom). 
94 Section 426, Insolvency Act 1986 (United Kingdom) which allows the court receiving a 
request from the court of a relevant country or territory, to apply the “insolvency law which is 
applicable by either court in relation to comparable matters falling within its jurisdiction”, 
subject to any considerations of private international law that might arise. 
95 Re Phoenix, above note 10, at paragraph 62, also echoing statements in Cambridge Gas. 
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provisions in insolvency, even if the latter would not apply. However, a wider 
and more radical view might be to see, as in Re Phoenix and Primeo, that the 
powers are in fact those in the statute, whose extension in aid of foreign 
proceedings is amply justified by the precept on active assistance, which may 
be usefully summarised as: if the court assists, it makes available all of its 
available law, meaning the common law and also any appropriate rules that 
are statute based, unless to do so would denature the purpose of the statute 
itself.96 This is not so far from the view in Cambridge Gas, in which its 
expansive view on assistance is stated as being qualified by any domestic 
statutory rule militating to the contrary. Interestingly, this view is comforted by 
the question asked in the instant proceedings as to the effect of the 
recognition order. For the judge, the possibility is that simply recognising 
foreign proceedings and the appointment of an office-holder has the effect of 
“domesticating” the foreign order and making it enforceable by whatever 
means available, including through the extension of all available law. Unlike in 
Primeo, however, the judge is reluctant to state that this step is to be treated 
as equivalent to the opening of ancillary proceedings and would leave the 
precise extent of the provisions that could be invoked to be determined by the 
courts, albeit with the active assistance principle uppermost in their minds. 
 
In the Court of Appeal, however, the statements made as to the extent of the 
common law assistance principle do not help clarify what should be the 
position at Bermudian common law. The statements at best represent 
desirable aims, but do not reflect concrete approaches to judicial assistance. 
Though the court is of the view that Rubin and Cambridge Gas can be read 
together and are not necessarily opposed in their impact, it does not read the 
impact as leading to the permissive granting of powers under a statute usually 
employed in a domestic liquidation to a foreign office-holder, even in aid of 
foreign proceedings. A more restrictive reading by the court of what powers 
exist within the court’s inherent jurisdiction is comforted here by what it 
regards as the tenuous link the Cayman entity and the order sought have to 
Bermuda, such as to qualify the attempt to seek discovery and production in 
Bermuda as a form of forum-shopping. This, the Court of Appeal will not 
countenance as being a legitimate use of the powers, even if they were 
available as the judge at first instance thought they might. As to what powers 
might be available and in what circumstances, the court does not say. What it 
does state, however, is that the expansive view in Cambridge Gas of what 
judicial assistance is, a view incidentally reflected in much jurisprudence 
around the world, cannot be read in the way that so many have sought in 
order to justify the extension of assistance in areas uncontemplated by 




The common law has had vocation in the past and in many jurisdictions to 
come to the aid of the foreign office-holder and of foreign proceedings. On an 
incremental basis, the view has been taken, whether in reliance on comity and 
general judicial practice or on principles appropriate to insolvency such as 
                                                 
96 This is in fact how section 426, Insolvency Act 1986 (United Kingdom) is intended to work. 
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unity and universality, that assistance can be forthcoming in such and such a 
situation, carefully defined. This incremental practice had at least the 
advantage that the judges became accustomed over time to what would 
otherwise be regarded as at first mere novelties, while in each case, there 
appear to be careful attempts to anchor the decision by the weight of 
precedent and previous curial practice. In this light, Cambridge Gas 
represented a break with the past, for understandable reasons, not least the 
need to choose between the orthodoxy of private international law and the 
commercial reality of the modern management of bankruptcy/insolvency 
proceedings, particularly those exhibiting complex features, including cross-
border components. It was also understandable because the web of 
legislative instruments (laws, treaties, European Regulations, model laws and 
other benchmarking texts) has not yet been successful in extending itself to 
the whole world, leaving countless jurisdictions without workable cross-border 
assistance mechanisms, except such as can be crafted at common law and at 
the hands of the judges.  
 
In this process, much depends on judicial attitudes and, a feature of many of 
these cases, whether support exists in judicial practice. It seemingly matters 
little whether that practice is at home or elsewhere, given the propensity of 
common law judges to seek out persuasive precedents from other 
jurisdictions. What is clear from the case commented on here is that the view 
in Bermuda is, certainly at the Court of Appeal level, that the common law 
cannot be artificially extended by judicial artifice without there being either 
strong support or strong statements of judicial intent in the cases that would 
lead naturally to the type of incremental precedent-building that could develop 
the law. Here, there is too tenuous a case for cooperation. This is not to say 
that, in other instances, there could not be the fact situations that would lend 
themselves to judicial creativity and to the type of formative rule-making that 
could itself serve as precedent for other cases. It may also be the case that 
the legislatures could be persuaded to enact rules to fill the lacunae in cross-
border insolvency frameworks revealed by these judgments, if indeed there is 
such an appetite in these jurisdictions and the case is suitably made. 
 
While the judges in the common law canvass for principles that will help 
develop the law in this area, the debate between what Rubin and Cambridge 
Gas did or did not say will continue. Although the Bermudian court sees no 
conflict between the two, this is certainly not the universal view. It is likely that 
Primeo will be taken to appeal in the Cayman Islands, especially now in light 
of this decision. It may be that both cases will end up before the Privy Council, 
which will then have the opportunity to pronounce on the (in)compatibility of 
Rubin and Cambridge Gas. That is certainly an event to anticipate, given the 
possibility of resolution of what appears at present to be two contrasting and 
diametrically opposed views of the extent of judicial cooperation and 
assistance. In the interim, the situation in Bermuda and other similar 
jurisdictions exists in a state of flux, albeit one in which judicial creativity can 
still occur, although at a more modest pace than that attempted at first 
instance in the present case. 
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